These are the same companies that don’t support second factors, only have their app as a second factor, or only SMS second factor. Is it too much to ask for smart card or token (yubikey) support?

  • @l_b_iOPEnglish
    7•7 months ago

    I think your missing the point. It doesn’t matter how good an individuals security practices are if the system itself has bad security architecture.

    • @[email protected]English
      1•7 months ago

      So in your post you refer to, for example, an admin at microsoft headquarters having to change his password, not the user of one of microsofts services being forced to change their password?

      • @l_b_iOPEnglish
        1•7 months ago

        I am generally more annoyed at the second bit, the user having to change their password. Both are problems, but internal policies for changes are usually documented and communicated.

        • @[email protected]English
          1•7 months ago

          Having to change the services password is just a few buttons in the password manager, but it helps mitigating brute force attacks and limits the attackers access to the validity period of the password. So that’s very beneficial.

          • @l_b_iOPEnglish
            1•7 months ago

            It doesn’t matter how good an individuals security is, its the system that’s a problem. Passwords are not often compromised through brute force. Password resets are a much more efficient entry method.

            https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-FAQ/#q-b05

            Q-B05: Is password expiration no longer recommended? A-B05:

            SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 states:

            “Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL force a change if there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.”

            Users tend to choose weaker memorized secrets when they know that they will have to change them in the near future. When those changes do occur, they often select a secret that is similar to their old memorized secret by applying a set of common transformations such as increasing a number in the password. This practice provides a false sense of security if any of the previous secrets has been compromised since attackers can apply these same common transformations. But if there is evidence that the memorized secret has been compromised, such as by a breach of the verifier’s hashed password database or observed fraudulent activity, subscribers should be required to change their memorized secrets. However, this event-based change should occur rarely, so that they are less motivated to choose a weak secret with the knowledge that it will only be used for a limited period of time.

            Q-B06: Are password composition rules no longer recommended? A-B06:

            SP 800-63B Section 5.1.1.2 paragraph 9 recommends against the use of composition rules (e.g., requiring lower-case, upper-case, digits, and/or special characters) for memorized secrets. These rules provide less benefit than might be expected because users tend to use predictable methods for satisfying these requirements when imposed (e.g., appending a ! to a memorized secret when required to use a special character). The frustration they often face may also cause them to focus on minimally satisfying the requirements rather than devising a memorable but complex secret. Instead, a blacklist of common passwords prevents subscribers from choosing very common values that would be particularly vulnerable, especially to an online attack.

            Composition rules also inadvertently encourage people to use the same password across multiple systems since they often result in passwords that are difficult for people to memorize.